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Limiting Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through Emissions Trading:
An Interim Report
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the WTO Subsidies Agreement
Richard W. Parker*
SUMMARY
The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment has gathered a
prominent group of policy analysts to consider how the United States might implement its Kyoto
commitment, using tradable permits in tandem with other methods. The draft report of the group,
entitled Limiting Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through Emissions Trading: Interim Report, examines four
policy options. This Memorandum considers whether any of these options appear likely to conflict with
United States international trade obligations under the newly established Uruguay Round Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (‘WTO Agreement’).
This summary outlines the relevant law and summarizes my conclusions on the WTO issues
raised by the options. The full analysis supporting those conclusions is contained in the Memorandum
that follows.
The principal WTO issues raised by the Interim Report are: (1) whether the product standards
envisioned by Options I, III and IV provide national (non-discriminatory) treatment to foreign products;
and (2) whether the grant of free permits under the cap-and-trade schemes of Options I, III and IV
would comprise an ‘actionable subsidy’ under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (Subsidies Agreement).2

*

Author has served as Special Counsel to Deputy Administrator and Coordinator for Trade and Environment
Policy at EPA; and Assistant General Counsel at Office of the United States Trade Representative. He is currently
Associate Professor at University of Connecticut School of Law, where he teaches and writes in the fields of Trade
and Environment, International Environmental Law, and domestic Environmental Law.
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The United States, historically, has been the main user of the Subsidies Agreement (and its WTO
predecessors). Other countries are much less active as plaintiffs in the field of subsidies. This, coupled with the
‘halo effect’ of the climate change issue, might shelter all the options described in the Interim Report from any
subsidies challenge. That happy result should not be assumed, however. Three of the options described in the
Report are clearly designed to ‘compensate’ U.S. industry. Moreover, the activity level of other countries is rising,
and ‘climate change’ policies that come to be regarded as cloaks for disguised protection will not only enjoy no halo
effect, they might well trigger a backlash. Finally, it will be seen that many of the straight and narrow doctrinal
positions previously advocated by the United States in its capacity as a subsidy plaintiff (and advocate of stricter
disciplines) could come back to haunt the United States in defending various climate change strategies from
subsidies challenge.

1

This Memorandum concludes that U.S. product standards imposing minimum mileage or energy
efficiency requirements for products -- be they cars, trucks, refrigerators, or air conditioners -- are not
likely to raise WTO concerns so long as they are crafted in a way that does not discriminate against
imported products.3

The more difficult issue is whether and under what circumstances the grant of free

permits under Options I, III and IV would constitute an actionable subsidy.
The WTO Subsidies Agreement defines an ‘actionable subsidy’ as (1) a non-de minimis ‘financial
contribution’ that (2) is bestowed on ‘specific’ enterprises or industries; and (3) causes or threatens
‘injury’ or ‘serious prejudice’ to foreign manufacturers of like products.
A ‘financial contribution’, for our purpose, is a government practice analogous to a direct transfer
of funds. The contribution is non-de minimis if it yields, directly or indirectly, a benefit that is greater
than 1 percent of the receiving firm’s total sales of all products or, if the subsidy is limited to certain
products, 1 percent of the firm’s total sales of the subsidized products. Here, the ‘financial contribution’
derives from the fact that ‘surplus’ permits – those not needed to meet regulatory operating requirements
– can be sold for cash.

The fact that the cash derives from non-governmental third parties is irrelevant

– indirect subsidies are subsidies. The fact that a subsidy is received as partial compensation for much
higher fuel costs and/or fuel conversion costs or other regulatory compliance costs is likewise irrelevant:
with one small exception not applicable here, the Subsidies Agreement treats subsidies for regulatory
compliance just like any other subsidy. Moreover, except in the special case of upstream subsidies as
described below, it makes no difference whether the receiving firm uses the subsidy to lower prices and
expand market share at the expense of foreign competitors, or whether it simply returns the subsidy as
rent to employees, management or shareholders.

So permits are a financial contribution to the extent

that they are surplus to operating needs. This Memorandum argues, however, that only ‘surplus’ permits
are a financial contribution. Permits issued and used to support on-going operations are more
appropriately classified as regulatory instruments – they calibrate the degree of emissions reduction
required – rather than subsidies.

3

A GATT dispute panel recently upheld a U.S. standards law closely analogous to the standards schemes
discussed in the Interim Report, even though the standard was crafted in a way that burdened foreign producers, de
facto, more heavily than their U.S. rivals. General Agreement On Tariffs and Trade: United States -- Taxes on
Automobiles, DS 31/R, Sept. 29, 1994. While that decision is not a binding precedent, it does suggest that the
scrutiny given to facially neutral product standards is likely to be fairly lenient. The safest course, obviously, is to
avoid regulations which have any differential and adverse impact on imports.
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The ‘specificity’ requirement of the Subsidies Agreement is needed to avoid the absurdity of
holding generally available subsidies (like roads, bridges, schools, tax deductions, etc.) actionable under
the WTO.

The specificity doctrine thus holds that subsidies made available, and used, economy-wide

are non-specific, while those confined (de jure or de facto) to a single industry or enterprise are specific.
What is unclear is whether subsidies made available to, and used by, several large industry groups – but
not the whole economy – would be considered specific. We know that the question would be analyzed
in two parts: (1) is a ‘small’ number of enterprises or industries legally eligible for the subsidies (de jure
specificity); and if not, (2) does a ‘small’ number of enterprises or industries disproportionately use the
subsidies (de facto specificity).

We know that subsidies need not be made available economy-wide in

order to be non-specific: the U.S. has repeatedly held, for example, that subsidies to the ‘agricultural
sector’ are de jure non-specific due to the wide variety of products encompassed in that sector. We also
know, from the precedents, that there appears to be an inter-play between enterprise numericity and
industry diversity: subsidies made available to a large number of firms in a single (or two) industries will
be considered specific; subsidies extending to only a few firms in different industries are also likely to be
deemed specific; but subsidies extending to a large number of firms spanning a wide variety of different
industries are likely to be deemed non-specific, unless a few firms or industries receive a disproportionate
share of the benefits.

In the last analysis, however, confident predictions are hard to make: both the

WTO Agreement and U.S. doctrine and practice are intentionally vague on what is a ‘small’ number of
firms or industries; specificity determinations in intermediate situations (such as ours) are made case-bycase and without clear guidelines.
The ‘injury’ and ‘serious prejudice’ tests are a ‘rule of reason’ for subsidies law. They hold that
importing governments may not take action against subsidized products that do not cause or threaten
‘injury’ to competing manufacturers in their own market; nor may they complain of subsidies that do not
cause or threaten ‘serious prejudice’ to competitors in the exporting country market or in third-country
markets. Note the difference in formulation: ‘injury’ may be caused by subsidized products (regardless
of the margin of subsidy); serious prejudice must result from the impact of the subsidy itself (in which
case the margin of subsidy is likely to be relevant). In both cases, the indicia of harm are similar: price
cutting and/or market share expansion (or retention) beyond that which would occur without the
subsidy/subsidized import.

Because of the highly fact-specific nature of the injury and serious prejudice

determinations, they are very difficult to predict in the abstract.

Most of the legal analysis of this

Memorandum will thus focus on the application of the first two requirements.
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Option I features a tradable permits scheme and a series of energy efficiency product standards.
The permit scheme would cap aggregate emissions from large U.S. stationary fossil fuel combustors (e.g.
facilities using boilers of greater than 100 million Btus/hour or consuming more than 1,000 tons of coal
per year). The cap would be set at 510 million tons of carbon (MtC) per year, distributed among covered
sources according to each source’s pro rata share of carbon emissions in some baseline year, such as
1990.

Under the formula, it is expected that 375 MtC would be allocated to electricity generators. The

remaining 135 MtC would be allocated among a variety of industrial combustors that meet the ‘large
source’ criteria: petroleum products and petrochemicals, basic organic and inorganic chemicals,
pesticides, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, paints, adhesives, soaps and cleaning compounds, pulp and paper
and paper products, resins, synthetic rubber and man-made fibers, primary metals, and cement, glass,
bricks, lime and other stone and ceramic products.
baseline year) would receive no permits.

New large sources (those constructed after the

Sources would be free to buy and sell permits as needed to

support their operations, but all sources, new and old, would be required to hold one permit for every ton
of carbon emitted, and that permit would be consumed by the emission of that ton. The permit scheme
would cover only U.S. manufacturers.

Assuming, as the Interim Report does, that permits would be

valued at $75 each, the total value of all permits issued to electricity generators and large industrial
combustors would be $28 billion and $10 billion, respectively.
The key issue raised by Option I is whether it will bestow non-de minimis subsidies on ‘specific’
enterprises and industries causing injury or serious prejudice to foreign competitors.

Option I makes a

large number and wide variety of sources eligible for permits: it is unlikely to be deemed de jure specific.
To the extent that Option I distributes ‘surplus’ permits relatively thinly and widely across the categories
of eligible users, it seems most unlikely that Option I will yield either de facto specific or greater than de
minimis subsidies. (Remember, most sources that continue in full operation will receive far fewer permits
than they need to support even baseline year sales under traditional manufacturing methods: any
‘surpluses’ they achieve will likely be rather meager in relation to their overall production levels.)
Thus, the principal way that Option I could lead to subsidies trouble is if it allocates permits in a way that
has the effect of focusing a large number and the predominant share of ‘surplus’ permits on relatively few
firms and/or industries. Such a concentration of large surpluses would lead to a finding of de facto
specificity and would increase the likelihood of non-de minimis subsidies.

There are two ways such a

concentration might come about in practice. First, Option I appears to award permits on the basis of
historic emissions, rather than on the basis of sources’ estimated potential for future emissions reduction.

4

This increases the likelihood of concentrating substantial surpluses among those lucky firms/industries
that happen to enjoy abundant, low-cost emissions reductions opportunities. Second, Option I as written
appears to contemplate that sources made eligible for permits as a result of their emissions in the baseline
year will continue to accrue permits for their owners even if the source is later closed or radically
downsized. Such a rule will virtually ensure the accrual of significant, potentially actionable subsidies
for owners who close or downsize covered U.S. manufacturing facilities.4

Concern for subsidies

consequences would counsel (1) amending the allocation formula to reflect a ‘best guess’ of the average
emissions reduction potential for various classes and categories of sources; and (2) implementing Option I
under a rule which limits (perhaps time limits) the ability of firms to accrue permits in respect of closed or
downsized manufacturing facilities.
The preceding analysis examined the award of permits to large industrial combustors. Subsidies
concerns might also arise in relation to the award of gratis permits to electricity generators. Although
most electric utilities do not sell their product internationally, electric utilities do sell power to
manufacturing facilities and if their power is deemed subsidized, the manufactured product would be
deemed to have received an ‘upstream subsidy.’

Under long-standing U.S. practice (unmodified by the

Uruguay Round), an upstream subsidy is defined as any subsidy that (1) is paid on an input product; (2)
bestows a competitive advantage on the downstream product; and (3) has a significant effect on the cost
of manufacturing the downstream product. If an upstream subsidy is deemed specific to the utility, the
specificity finding would apply to all downstream buyers from that plant, regardless of their number and
diversity. Thus, the key issue is whether electricity generators who are able to amass large surpluses pass
the benefit through to their customers (or, worse, to certain, favored industrial customers) and whether the
passed through benefit represents a significant portion of manufacturing cost and bestows a competitive
advantage on the manufactured product.

In this analysis, the benchmark for comparison will be, not

electricity prices pre-Option I, but what electricity prices would be under Option I without the grant of
surplus permits to the generator. Further economic analysis would be needed to assess the likelihood of
competitively significant electricity subsidies being conferred under Option I.

4
A rule that ‘subsidizes’ plant closure is also likely to generate political opposition. Regardless of whether
the plant closure reflects a decision to exit the industry (creating a market opportunity for imports) or to re-locate
manufacturing overseas, critics will charge that the result is the same: domestic production is replaced by imports,
U.S. jobs are lost, and (since foreign facilities also release greenhouse gases) global carbon emissions are simply
displaced, not reduced.
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Option II seeks near total coverage of carbon emissions within an administratively manageable
cap and trade permit scheme. It would require, and ration, permits for the sale of all carbon fuels (coal,
oil and natural gas), while imposing the permit requirement at the narrowest points in the energy
distribution chain. Permits would be auctioned (rather than given away) at the point of extraction for
coal, refining for petroleum, and distribution for natural gas. Permits would also be required for imports
of refined petroleum products. The cost of permits would confront all users of energy with price
increases (highest for carbon-rich coal) that would encourage them to conserve fuel and/or switch to
lower carbon fuels.
This Memorandum concludes that Option II would pose no conflict with WTO rules provided it
is implemented in a manner which does not discriminate covertly against imports by, for example,
calculating the carbon content of foreign and domestic fuels/products by a discriminatory methodology
that requires foreign suppliers to hold more permits per unit than similarly situated domestic producers.
Option III is described as a ‘more complex, but possibly more politically attractive’ permit
system. Besides imposing a series of energy-efficiency product standards (as in Option I), it would
require all extractors of coal, oil and natural gas to hold a permit for each unit of fuel sold in the United
States. The overall supply of permits -- and the U.S. supply of fossil fuel -- would be capped at a level
that promotes compliance with the Unites States’ Kyoto commitment.

Permits would be issued free-of-

charge to coal, oil and gas extractors based on each supplier’s pro rata share of the U.S. market in some
baseline year, such as 1990.

However, half the supply of permits that otherwise would go to coal

extractors would be diverted to coal combustors, who would receive the permits free of any regulatory
obligation. Since combustors would have no need of the permits they receive, it is expected that
combustors would simply sell their permits back to coal, oil or gas extractors who do need them.
Since Option III treats oil and gas producers, coal producers, and coal combustors differently,
each requires a separate WTO analysis. Oil and gas producers will find their permits to produce and
import oil and gas rationed under Option III. The national treatment provisions of the WTO Agreement
will require that domestic and imported oil and gas be assigned permits under the same formula (unless
there is a compelling reason not to do so).

This should not raise undue political opposition in the United

States, since it is well understood by now that the WTO requires national treatment of all products,
including oil and gas products.5
5

Moreover, Option III should not raise subsidies issues in respect of oil

The WTO Agreement will not require the United States to grant permits to pariah nations like Iran and Iraq
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and gas producers if, as seems likely, such producers continue to supply oil and gas up to the level
allowed by the number of permits allocated them, or affordable at market prices.

Subsidies issues will

begin to arise only at the point at which individual oil and gas producers begin to accumulate major stores
of ‘surplus’ permits.

Foreign oil and gas producers can probably be precluded, if necessary, from

amassing large surpluses.6

But domestic oil and gas producers would be deemed to have received a

specific subsidy, and it would be actionable if the other conditions mentioned above were met.
Oil and gas producers could generate large surpluses only by reducing sales in the United States
market below their baseline-year levels.

Given that coal conversion is likely to increase the demand for

oil and gas, why would any profit-maximizing oil and gas company choose to reduce its U.S. sales?
Mainly because, under Option III as written, every unit of oil/gas that was sold by a company in the
allocation baseline year generates one permit a year, in perpetuity, for the selling company. If the
corresponding unit of oil and gas is diverted overseas in the allocation year, that generates a subsidy -- in
the form of a one free, salable permit each year -- for the diverting oil and gas company.

Given this

incentive, oil and gas companies with historic U.S. sales almost certainly will choose to divert some
traditional U.S. supplies of oil and gas to overseas markets. That diversion will create a price-spike of oil
and gas in the United States which will either lure in new suppliers who will buy permits to meet the
demand, or reduce the incentive for historic suppliers to divert. Eventually, supply and demand will
equilibrate at a U.S. price which equals the overseas price of oil and gas plus the market value of the
associated permits.

From the standpoint of U.S. oil and gas consumers, Option III will be identical to

Option II in terms of energy price impact: unit energy prices will increase by the full amount of the cost
of purchasing the corresponding permits.

But the revenues that would go to the government under

Option II’s auction system will be lavished on historic oil and gas suppliers as subsidies under Option III.
In practice, few foreign countries are likely to complain of receiving subsidized oil and gas from the
United States or erstwhile U.S. suppliers.

But the U.S. political opposition to such a scheme could be

considerable, and WTO subsidies issues could arise if oil and gas companies use revenues from the sale
of surplus permits to ‘cross-subsidize’ other manufactured products into which those companies diversify:
under Option III any more than it requires the United States to import oil and gas from these countries now. Such
countries have long been excluded from the United States market under the national security exceptions of GATT
Article XXI. Option III would not change that.
6

While a WTO panel might conceivably regard this as a violation of the national treatment norm, the better
view is that such a rule simply channels the subsidy element implicit in surplus permits to domestic providers. The
WTO Agreement expressly exempts domestic subsidies from national treatment obligations.
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indirect subsidies are subsidies. One way to avoid this result is to craft an anti-diversion rule for Option
III: e.g. reduce each oil and gas firm’s entitlement to ‘surplus’ permits (permits in excess of allocationyear U.S. oil and gas sales) by the amount of any increase in that firm’s overseas sales of oil and gas in
the allocation year (or increase above a certain level) compared to the baseline year.
The treatment of coal extractors under Option III raises somewhat different concerns.

Coal

extractors will receive a supply of permits that reflects less than half their baseline year production.
They also will confront a shrinking domestic demand for coal. To the extent they respond by simply
downsizing operations to a level that reflects the reduced demand and the scarcity of available and
affordable permits, no WTO issues will arise. However, some coal extractors may choose to reduce
domestic coal sales by more than the amount required by the scarcity of permits. Revenues from sales of
surplus permits could then be used to cross-subsidize (a) increased coal sales in foreign markets
(‘diversion’), or (b) transition from coal mining into some other line of production (‘industry exit’).
Certainly diversion of sales to foreign markets will be attractive to mining companies who wish to stay in
the business. Although coal extractors will see half of their permits siphoned off to combustors, it is
conceivable that certain extractors with historically large U.S. sales could divert so much coal to foreign
markets that they would amass a considerable revenue stream from sale of now-‘surplus’ permits.
Besides undermining the global climate benefit, such a response could elicit subsidies challenges from
foreign coal suppliers. Similarly, coal extractors who choose to exit the coal mining business -- by
shifting/diversifying into non-coal product lines -- might also accumulate considerable revenues from sale
of permits awarded them in respect of historic production levels. This could raise a risk of subsidies
challenge from foreign manufacturers of these other products. If these diversion/exit scenarios are
deemed plausible, they may argue for some limitation (perhaps time limits) on the eligibility of
diverting/exiting coal extraction firms to continue to receive permits in respect of historic coal production.
The treatment of coal combustors under Option III could raise issues under the WTO Subsidies
Agreement, though a proper assessment of the litigation risk would require further economic analysis.
Clearly, the free permits issued to coal combustors would all be ‘surplus’ to those combustors and would
all be sold back to extractors for cash or fuel purchase price offsets.

Ninety (90) percent of the permits

awarded coal combustors under Option III would flow to coal-fired electric power plants and would
clearly be deemed a ‘specific’ subsidy.

Although most electric utilities do not sell anything moving in

international trade, Option III would raise the ‘upstream subsidy’ issues discussed under Option I, with
one crucial difference: Option III likely will to leave electric utilities with many more ‘surplus’ permits.
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The remaining 10 percent of the coal combustors’ share of permits would be distributed among
about ten major industry groups, with a concentration in four: primary metals, paper and paper products,
chemicals and allied products, and food products. None of these industry groups would receive even 2
percent of the overall subsidy. While the law on specificity is somewhat vague, as mentioned, a review
of available precedents suggests that a de jure or de facto specificity finding on these facts is unlikely.
Option IV inverts Option III, with a twist.

Instead of requiring extractors to hold permits to

sell and issuing ‘freeby’ permits to large combustors (as in Option III), Option IV would require large
combustors to hold permits to emit while issuing permits to large combustors and coal extractors. Since
coal extractors would not need the emissions permits issued to them, they would sell the permits back to
the combustors. Option IV is thus made politically attractive to coal extractors in the same way that
Option III is attractive to coal combustors. The ‘twist is that auto manufacturers who sell in the United
States market also would be required to hold emissions permits (allocated on the basis of each
automaker’s future emissions commitment for its fleet.) Automakers would be allowed to trade permits
with combustors or coal extractors on a market basis, subject to the regulatory requirement that each
automaker must hold one permit for each unit of future emissions predicted from its fleet.
This Memorandum concludes that the issuance of permits to automakers and their inclusion
within the cap and trade scheme of Option IV would not raise serious WTO issues provided that fleet
emissions are forecast via methodologies that are consistent for all fleets and do not discriminate against
foreign manufacturers. The treatment of large stationary combustors seems unlikely to raise significant
WTO issues since such combustors, under Option IV, will not receive any meaningful volumes of surplus
permits except, again, to the extent they exit their industries, and they are unlikely to exit their main line
of business merely in order to generate a relatively meager ration of surplus permits. The preferential
treatment afforded domestic coal extractors, on the other hand, would raise the subsidies issues discussed
in connection with the treatment of coal extractors under Option III, aggravated by the fact that coal
extractors under Option IV would receive permits unencumbered by regulatory obligations, and thus
would have many more ‘surplus’ permits to work with. In practice, the United States is an insignificant
importer of coal, so foreign governments are not likely to bother complaining of domestic coal subsidies
on import substitution grounds. The main risk of a subsidies challenge would arise if, and to the extent
that, U.S. coal extractors use revenues from permit sales to cross-subsidize coal (or other product) sales in
foreign markets.
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Limiting Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through Emissions Trading:
An Interim Report
Comments on WTO Aspects
Richard W. Parker
In the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the United States
committed, subject to Senate ratification, to reduce aggregate net emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG)
by 8 percent below 1990 levels within the period 2008-2012. It is now widely accepted that this
commitment cannot be met by voluntary measures. Increased energy taxes seem politically out of the
question in the United States.

Businesses are more favorably inclined to the idea of tradable emissions

permits (assuming anything is to done), and it is now widely agreed that any U.S. initiative to comply
with its Kyoto commitment is likely to feature some variation on the theme of tradable emissions permits.
Yet, until now, very little detailed work has been done on what a tradable emissions scheme for GHG
might look like.
The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment has gathered a
prominent group of policy analysts to study the question of how the United States might implement its
Kyoto commitment, using tradable permit approaches in tandem with other methods. (Supplementary
methods, as discussed below, are necessary because of the incredible number and variety of GHG
sources, many of which are too small and/or difficult to monitor to incorporate in a manageable GHG
emissions trading scheme.) The draft report of the group, entitled Limiting Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Through Emissions Trading: Interim Report, lays out four options for complying with the Kyoto
commitment.

The Interim Report examines a variety of technical, economic and political issues

associated with each of these options. This Memorandum addresses each of the Options in turn, and
considers whether, to what extent, and under what circumstances, each of these options appears likely to
conflict with United States international trade obligations as set forth in the newly established Uruguay
Round Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (‘WTO Agreement’).

A few preliminary

observations may be useful in setting the stage for what follows.
Preliminary Observations. The analysis which follows focuses strictly on the WTO aspects of
measures directly proposed in the Interim Report. However, it should be recognized that a scheme for
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rationing emissions rights to domestic producers is not likely to stop there: energy-intensive U.S.
manufacturers are likely to respond to costly limits on carbon combustion and/or higher-priced electricity
inputs by demanding either extension of the scheme to cover imported ‘like products’ or protection of
domestic industry via cash subsidies, import surcharges, and/or export rebates. (This political response
by U.S. manufacturers will be exacerbated to the extent that foreign producers are not subject to any
comparable requirements in their home markets; and attenuated to the extent they are.)

Any subsidies

or border adjustments or restrictions granted in response to such demands would raise serious and
difficult WTO issues, unless the WTO were itself clarified or amended to accommodate such measures.
Second, the principal WTO concerns raised by the four options are subsidies concerns. In
analyzing the various options we will focus on detailed examination of the relevant provisions of the
WTO Subsidies Agreement in light of U.S. doctrine and practice interpreting and applying these
provisions.

A focus on U.S. doctrine may be questioned since it is clear that the U.S. is not going to

bring an action against its own practices. However, I believe a focus on U.S. subsidies doctrine is
necessary and appropriate, for the following reasons. The Subsidies Agreement is only four years old, it
is not a model of clarity, and only a handful of subsidies cases interpreting the Agreement have been
decided either by the WTO or in countries other than the United States. I have found no authoritative
travaux or negotiating history for the Agreement, nor have I found any subsequent WTO panel decisions
or foreign countervailing duty decisions on point. [Can any readers of this draft help me on this?]
Because the United States has brought the vast majority of countervailing duty cases decided since 1947 - initially under Articles VI and XVI of the 1947 WTO as clarified by the 1979 Subsidies Agreement and,
since 1994, under the Subsidies Agreement -- existing practice in the area of subsidies enforcement is
largely the story of U.S. practice. And because the United States has taken the position that the new
Agreement largely codifies existing U.S. practice in most respects relevant to this discussion,1 we must
anticipate that the United States is likely to be unwilling (or unable) to defend, in some hypothetical
future dispute involving emissions trading, a position that contravenes the United States’ own previous
doctrine and practice.
Third, the United States is without question the most frequent and tight-fisted (some would say
protectionist) enforcer of subsidies disciplines. Only a handful of other countries have brought subsidies

1

See, e.g., United States Statement of Administrative Action at 255 (subsidy definition reflects U.S. practice)
and 260-261 (specificity test reflects U.S. practice), reprinted in Applebaum at 231 and 237, respectively.
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complaints and then only in a relative handful of cases.

Analyzing the Options in terms of WTO

doctrine elucidated by United States practice thus provides a conservative estimate of litigation risk.
Fourth, although WTO Article XX provides a limited exception from normal WTO disciplines for
trade measures ‘necessary’ to protect human, animal or plant life or health (Art. XX(b)), or ‘relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources’ (Art. XX(g)), these exceptions are to the main WTO 1947
Agreement. WTO Article XX probably will be found not to qualify application of the Subsidies
Agreement. Unlike the 1979 Subsidies Agreement, the Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement does not
purport to be an interpretation of Articles VI and XVI of the 1947 WTO. It is a separate and new
agreement.

The ‘actionability’ of any scheme thus will depend on how it fares under the Subsidies

Agreement standing alone.
Finally, it bears mention that WTO is a legal regime, but it is also a political institution.
Although the WTO has dealt harshly with ‘unilateral’ U.S. trade sanctions aimed at protecting the
environment, it has dealt rather softly with trade measures adopted pursuant to multilateral environmental
agreements. Indeed, no challenge has yet been brought to trade measures adopted pursuant to CITES,
the Basel Convention, or the ozone treaty, despite the technical vulnerability to challenge of trade
measures employed under each of these conventions.

The climate treaty is among the most salient of

international environmental agreements and bona fide climate change implementation measures are likely
to benefit from an informal presumption in their favor. However, this presumption will certainly be
rebuttable by any showing of bright-line transgressions of WTO rules involving clear favoritism of
particular firms or industries.
The discussion of Option I will set forth the main contours of the WTO analysis which applies to
all the options. Having developed the relevant WTO legal analysis in discussion of Option I, we will
then be in a position to build on that analysis in dealing more briefly with the remaining three.
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OPTION I
Option I consists of two main control strategies: (a) a tradable corporate average carbon
emissions (CACE) standard for automobiles and a (possibly tradable) set of energy efficiency standards
for refrigerators, air conditioners, building furnaces, and other electricity or fossil-fuel using equipment;
and (b) a ‘cap-and-trade’ scheme covering ‘large stationary combustors.’ The permit scheme would cap
aggregate emissions from facilities using boilers of greater than 100 million Btus/hour or consuming
more than 1,000 tons of coal per year. The cap would be set at 510 million tons of carbon (MtC) per
year, distributed among covered sources according to each source’s pro rata share of carbon emissions in
some baseline year, such as 1990.

Under the formula, it is expected that 375 MtC would be allocated to

electricity generators. The remaining 135 MtC would be allocated among a variety of industrial
combustors that meet the ‘large source’ criteria: petroleum products and petrochemicals, basic organic
and inorganic chemicals, pesticides, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, paints, adhesives, soaps and cleaning
compounds, pulp and paper and paper products, resins, synthetic rubber and man-made fibers, primary
metals, and cement, glass, bricks, lime and other stone and ceramic products.
constructed after the baseline year) would receive no permits.

New large sources (those

Sources would be free to buy and sell

permits as needed to support their operations, but all sources, new and old, would be required to hold one
permit for every ton of carbon emitted, and that permit would be consumed by the emission of that ton.
The permit scheme would cover only U.S. manufacturers.

Assuming, as the Interim Report does, that

permits would be valued at $75 each, the total value of all permits issued to electricity generators and
large industrial combustors would be $28 billion and $10 billion, respectively.
Option I, like the other options, will confront permit recipients with three possible courses of
action. First, recipients may choose to continue U.S. manufacturing output up to at least the historic
level of output, with only such reductions in output as are required by scarcity of emissions permits
allocated to them or available for purchase at affordable prices (“continuation strategy”). Second, permit
recipients may elect to re-locate U.S. manufacturing facilities overseas (“diversion strategy”).

Re-

location of facilities overseas will generate surplus permits for recipients if, and to the extent that the
option allows re-locating firms to continue to receive allocated permits in respect of baseline-year
emissions of now-closed or downsized facilities. Third, permit recipients may decide to exit their present
industry altogether, in favor of less carbon-intensive or non-covered production (“exit strategy”). Once
again, exit will generate surplus permits for recipients if, and to the extent that, the option allows exiting
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(or partially exiting) firms to continue to receive permits in respect of baseline-year emissions. While
Option I does not set forth explicit rules governing exit and diversion, conversations with drafters suggest
that Option I as presently conceived would allow re-locating firms and exiting firms to continue to
receive permits in respect of baseline-year emissions, at least for a period, say, five years.
Option I appears to contemplate a purely domestic scheme of emissions rights and regulations
which would not apply to imported goods.

The remaining discussion therefore assumes that imported

goods would remain totally outside the process emissions cap-and-trade scheme (sub-option (b)), though
they would need to conform to any product standards imposed under sub-option (a).
WTO Analysis
Product standards (sub-option (a)).

U.S. product standards imposing minimum mileage or

energy efficiency requirements for products -- be they cars, trucks, refrigerators, or air conditioners -- are
not likely to raise WTO concerns so long as they are crafted in a way that does not discriminate against
imported products.

Moreover, it appears that the paramount concern is to avoid facial discrimination

against foreign products. A recent WTO dispute panel upheld a U.S. standards scheme closely
analogous to the CACE – the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standard for automobiles –
even though that scheme was implemented in a way that burdened foreign producers, de facto, much
more heavily than their U.S. rivals.2

The only portion of the scheme rejected by the panel was a

provision which established separate fleet averaging rules for domestic and foreign fleets -- a facial
discrimination. While the CAFE case certainly does not stand for the proposition that flagrant cases of
de facto discrimination will never be struck down (and the CAFE decision itself will not bind future WTO
dispute panels), the CAFE panel’s refusal to find a national treatment violation in the face of a fairly
significant differential in regulatory impact (favoring domestic producers) suggests that the scrutiny given
to facially neutral product standards is likely to be fairly lenient.

While it remains, as always, desirable

to avoid differential and adverse impacts on imports, the key concern is to ensure that any standards do
not facially discriminate between domestically-manufactured and imported goods.
Large combustor cap-and-trade scheme (sub-option (b)).

The carbon emissions cap-and-

trade scheme set forth in sub-option (b) does not raise issues under the most favored nation and national
2

General Agreement On Tariffs and Trade: United States -- Taxes on Automobiles, DS 31/R, Sept. 29, 1994.
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treatment provisions of WTO Articles I and III, respectively, because it does not apply to imported
products. However, as discussed below, the provision of valuable emissions rights gratis to certain
combustors could constitute ‘actionable’ subsidies under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (Subsidies Agreement).3
The Subsidies Agreement divides national practices into three categories: red light, green light,
and other. ‘Red light’ subsidies -- government subsidies that are contingent on export performance or
use of domestic over imported goods -- are prohibited regardless of whether they are applied generally or
to specific industries and regardless of whether they cause adverse economic effects or not. See
Subsidies Agreement, Art. 3.

‘Green light’ subsidies are given an equally unqualified safe harbor from

WTO discipline. One of these categories of green lights subsidies involves ‘environmental subsidies,’
but the term is defined narrowly to cover only government assistance to promote adaptation of existing
facilities to new environmental requirements provided that the assistance: (i) is a one-time non-recurring
measure; and (ii) is limited to 20 percent of the cost of adaptation . . .

See Subsidies Agreement Art.

8.2. Since a yearly allotment of permits to domestic combustors sub-option (b) entails neither a
(prohibited) export or import substitution incentive nor a (permitted) one-time environmental subsidy, no
quick and easy analysis is available. We must look more deeply.
Under the Subsidies Agreement, a government practice is defined as a ‘subsidy’ if it is a
‘financial contribution’ that confers a benefit.

(Art. 1) A subsidy is actionable if it (a) confers a benefit

upon ‘certain enterprises’ (i.e. a limited number and variety of enterprises and industries) and (b) causes
‘injury to the domestic industry of another member’, ‘serious prejudice’ to the interests of another
Member, or ‘nullification or impairment’ of tariff concessions made by the subsidizing Member.
Actionable subsidies may trigger WTO dispute settlement proceedings leading to a WTO cease-and-desist
recommendation (and possible retaliatory tariffs) if such subsidies cause ‘serious prejudice’ to the
interests of another country in the subsidizing country’s own market or in a third-country market.
Actionable subsidies also may trigger countervailing duties on U.S. exports if the national authority of the

3
If a complaint is brought in WTO dispute settlement it is conceivable, though not likely, that the program as a
whole could be challenged facially as a violation of the Subsidies Agreement. The more likely prospect is that
Option I may challenged as applied to particular products or industries of concern to complainants. In a foreign
countervailing duty action, the scheme can only be challenged in terms of its application to products of the particular
industries bringing a complaint in that country.
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importing country finds that subsidized imports have caused or threaten ‘injury’ to a competing industry
in that country.

(Arts. 2, 5, 6, 7, 11).

The key elements to be analyzed, therefore, are (a) financial

contribution, (b) benefit, (c) specificity, and (d) injury, nullification or impairment, or serious prejudice.

Financial contribution
Article 1.1 of the Subsidies Agreement states:
For purposes of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if:
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of
a Member (referred to in this Agreement as ‘government’) i.e. where:
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity
infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees);
...
and
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.
An argument that permits are ‘financial contributions’ could rest on either of two analytical
foundations. The first is the broad view of ‘financial contribution’ adopted by the United States in its
long-standing countervailing duty practice, and in its Uruguay Round bargaining position, implementing
legislation and accompanying Statement of Administrative Action (SAA). United States practice
construes the term ‘financial contribution’ to encompass any “formal, enforceable measure which directly
led to a discernible benefit being provided to the industry under investigation.”4 In Certain Fasteners
from India: Final Countervailing Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty Order, the Commerce
Department concluded, in dicta, that an Indian tradable permit scheme -- which gave exporters special
licenses to import goods to replenish stocks of imported inputs – would have been countervailable (had it
been used) because the permits were negotiable and hence had market value and conferred a benefit on
the recipient. Even purely regulatory measures -- such as Canada’s ban on the export of unprocessed
logs and Argentina’s restriction on exports of unprocessed hides -- have been deemed indirect subsidies
to domestic processors in those countries. Any definition of subsidy broad enough to sweep in Canadian
log export restrictions and Indian import licensing schemes is likely to sweep in U.S. tradable emissions
permits as well.

4

SAA at 926.
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The breadth of this interpretation may, perhaps, be questioned.5

There is, however, a

second basis for characterizing permits as financial contributions. It is the simpler, narrower one that
permits are negotiable legal instruments which have clear and measurable monetary value, and their
transfer to certain recipients is like, if not identical to, a ‘direct transfer of funds.’ Few would dispute
that the concept of ‘funds’ is broad enough to include stocks, bonds, options, derivatives, and other legal
instruments which, when sold, yield cash.

Are all permits therefore financial contributions?

There is, in my view, a viable distinction between tradable permits that are needed to meet
regulatory requirements and ‘funds.’ Unlike stocks, bonds, etc., emissions permits issued under Option I
would be coupled with a regulatory requirement that requires each source to limit yearly carbon emissions
to a level that corresponds to the number of permits held. Companies who wish to continue to operate
cannot sell all their permits for cash. Only ‘surplus’ permits may be sold for cash. Non-surplus permits
do not ‘compensate’ facilities for emissions reductions requirements (as in classic environmental
subsidies); they simply calibrate the degree of emissions reduction that is required. They are a regulatory
mechanism; not a compensatory scheme.
What of the fact that Option I would award gratis permits to existing facilities and none at all to
new ones? Does this prove that new facilities are expected to achieve zero emissions such that any
award of permits to existing plants is ‘really’ a compensatory scheme and a subsidy per se?

The only

reasonable answer in my view is no, Option I clearly does not contemplate that any fossil-fuel facility will
operate at zero emissions. All facilities will need permits to operate. Existing facilities will receive
some permits free; new facilities will not. This does not prove that all permits issued to existing facilities
are a ‘financial contribution’; it merely proves that Option I discriminates against new sources.

Nothing

The Administration’s interpretation -- that a subsidy will be found in any regulation leading to a
discernible benefit to a domestic industry -- is so broad as to essentially read the requirement for a
‘financial contribution’ right out of the Subsidies Agreement. In fact, in Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 57 FR 22570 (May 28,
1992), Commerce defended its determination that Canada’s log export restrictions constituted an
indirect subsidy to Canadian softwood lumber producers (via a depressed price of cut timber inputs) by
noting, repeatedly, that the Subsidies Code definition of subsidy (pre-Uruguay Round) did not require a
‘financial contribution.’ After the Uruguay Round, the new Subsidies Agreement does require a
financial contribution, in so many words, yet Commerce takes the position that that makes no difference:
all regulatory practices that confer benefits are subsidies anyway!
5
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in the WTO Agreement prohibits discriminating against new sources on a national treatment basis. In
fact, U.S. environmental laws have “discriminated against” new sources for decades, by imposing higher
environmental standards on them than are imposed on existing sources, without ever triggering a WTO
challenge.
Thus, the better view is that ‘surplus’ permits – and only surplus permits – constitute a financial
contribution. The fact that the government never intentionally awards ‘surplus’ permits is immaterial.6
Likewise, the fact that permits are issued at no cost to the government is immaterial: the Subsidies
Agreement clearly confirms the long-standing U.S. position that benefit to the recipient, not cost to
government, is the touchstone of a subsidy.

Here, recipients benefit by at least the amount (and value)

of saleable surplus permits received at no cost from the government.

Benefit
Under the Subsidies Agreement, a subsidy exists if a financial contribution is made and a ‘benefit
is thereby conferred.’7

This use of the passive voice lends independent credence to the view that

benefits accruing indirectly from financial contributions (here, by reducing emissions and selling surplus
permits) are nonetheless benefits.8 It has been seen that the amount of the benefit is likely to be
measured by the market value of ‘surplus’ permits awarded to each enterprises covered facilities.
Two important features of the benefit calculation bear special mention. First, the benefit is not
likely to be offset further by the cost of reducing emissions to the level necessary to generate the surplus.
The fact that a subsidy is received as partial compensation for higher fuel costs and/or fuel conversion
costs or other regulatory compliance costs is irrelevant to the determination of whether a subsidy exists or
6

See Subsidies Agreement Article 1.1 (quoted above).

Subsidies Agreement Art. 1.1(b). This phrase puts to rest a long-standing dispute within WTO about
whether subsidies should be defined and measured on the basis of cost to government or, alternatively,
benefit to recipient. At least in cases where a financial contribution is provided, the U.S. position,
favoring benefit to the recipient as the litmus test of subsidy, has triumphed.
7

8
This use of the passive voice undermines the defense that government issuance of salable permits confers no
benefit because any revenues from such permits must be earned by reducing emissions over and above the allocated
amount in order to generate a surplus for sale. Under the Subsidies Agreement, it is not necessary that the
government contribute a benefit. It is only necessary that the government contribute something, and that a benefit
is thereby conferred.
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the calculation of the subsidy margin. With the one (inapplicable) exception of permissible
environmental subsidies described above, the Subsidies Agreement treats subsidies for regulatory
compliance just like any other subsidy.9

Second, the margin of benefit is not likely to be diminished (or

augmented) by the way the recipients use the subsidy. It simply will not matter whether or to what
degree the receiving companies use the subsidy to lower prices and gain competitive advantage, or
whether they simply return the subsidy as rent to employees, management, or shareholders.10
will be measured by the market value of surplus permits conferred on each enterprise, full stop.

Benefit
This

total benefit will be divided by the total yearly sales of the products benefitting from the subsidies, to
yield an ad valorem subsidy rate (‘subsidy margin’).

Subsidies that are not earmarked for particular

products would be allocated over the firm’s entire product sales.11
The Subsidies Agreement provides a safe harbor from countervailing duties for de minimis
subsidies, i.e., subsidies margins of less than 1 percent ad valorem.12
9

See Commerce Department, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Feb. 26, 1997, 62 FR 8818 (a subsidy that
reduces a firm’s cost of compliance with a regulation remains a subsidy even though the overall effect of the two
government actions, taken together, may leave the firm with higher costs).
10

Canada has maintained that ‘benefit’ should be measured not in terms of the monetary value of the
contribution, but in accordance with the competitive advantage derived thereby. This argument would reduce the
benefit by the portion of each contribution which was not used to cut prices or expand market share, but was simply
internalized as ‘rent’, i.e. retained as earnings, paid out to employees or dividended to shareholders. Distributions
disposed of in this way arguably do not ‘distort markets’ and therefore should not be counted as ‘benefit.’
Applying pre-Uruguay Round subsidies doctrine, Canada persuaded a U.S.-Canada Free Trade Area Binational
Review Panel (divided perfectly along national lines) to require Commerce to apply a market distortion analysis in
the appeal of the Commerce Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination in Certain Softwood Lumber
Products from Canada. Commerce followed orders in that case, but the United States has not accepted the general
proposition. In its recent Uruguay Round implementing legislation and Statement of Administrative Action, the
Clinton Administration reiterated its view that market impact should not be considered in determining whether a
subsidy has been provided. Moreover, nothing in the text of Article 1 of the Subsidies Agreement supports, much
less requires, Canada’s market distortion analysis.
11

See Subsidies Agreement, Annex IV.

12

See Subsidies Agreement, Art. 11.9. While, the Subsidies Agreement provides that benefits to any enterprise
in excess of 5 percent ad valorem will be deemed to cause serious prejudice per se (Article 6), Annex IV of the
Agreement stipulates that the 5 per cent subsidy calculation is to be determined on the basis of “cost to the granting
government.” Since emissions permits are costless to the government, the 5 percent threshold is inapplicable to our
case. However, firms using subsidies to ‘start up’ new lines of production are deemed to cause serious prejudice
pre se if the overall rate of subsidization in the first year of production exceeds 15 percent of the total funds invested
in the start-up. See Subsidies Agreement, Annex IV.
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Option I will bestow ‘surplus’ permits principally upon (1) firms continuing to operate facilities
that enjoy significant fuel-switching and/or other emissions reduction options; and (2) firms that close (or
radically downsize) facilities whose baseline-year emissions generate a continuing stream of permits.
Facility closure or downsizing might be done in order to exit the covered activity altogether (exit
strategy), or in order to re-locate covered facilities overseas (diversion strategy).

With regard to firms

and facilities continuing to operate at or above historic levels of output, it is significant that the Option I
cap-and-trade scheme assigns permits to individual manufacturing sources on the basis of historic
emissions, not on the basis of future emissions reduction potential. This allocation method increases the
likelihood -- though it by no means assures -- that certain firms or industries (e.g. historic coal combustors
blessed with inexpensive fuel switching options) will garner non-de-minimis levels of surplus permits and
subsidies. From a subsidies perspective, a more refined permit allocation formula based on estimates of
average future reduction potential of classes and categories of sources (rather than historic emissions)
would be preferred.
The prospect of plant closures (or downsizings) in response to Option I raises more difficult
subsidies issues.

As mentioned, such plant closings might occur either in connection with a firm’s

exit/partial exit from a high-carbon line of manufacturing, or in connection with the re-location of a
covered manufacturing facility overseas, presumably to an unregulated jurisdiction.

If plant

closure/downsizing causes forfeiture of the associated stream of permits, no subsidies issues arise. If,
however, Option I is implemented under a rule that allows plant closing firms to retain their entitlement to
the permit stream generated by the closed facility, then it is clear that the receiving firm could receive a
significant, on-going subsidy in the form of stream of surplus permits that are salable for cash.

Such a

result might – provided the other conditions of actionable subsidy are met – trigger a subsidies challenge
from foreign manufacturers of competing products. More likely, such an outcome (or the prospect of it)
might trigger strong political opposition in the United States, where critics would charge that Option I
rewards and encourages U.S. manufacturers to close U.S. facilities in order to generate unencumbered,
salable permits.

They would say that whether closure leads to exit of that firm from the industry or

merely re-location of the firm’s manufacturing overseas, the perverse result is the same: domestic
production is replaced by imports, U.S. jobs are lost, and (since foreign facilities also release greenhouse
gases) global carbon emissions are simply displaced, not reduced.
response in practice?

Microeconomic responses to policy stimuli are notoriously hard to model or
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predict; in any case, such an empirical question lies well outside this paper’s scope.

To the extent the

exit and re-location scenarios are deemed credible, they need to be addressed in the design of Option I.
They may argue for some limitation (perhaps time limits) on the eligibility of firms to continue to
receive permits in respect of historic production from closed facilities.

The special case of upstream subsidies.

The allocation formula contemplated by Option I

would bestow a major share of annual issue of permits on fossil-fuel (especially coal-fired) electric
utilities. Many of these utilities will have options for converting from coal/oil to natural gas, thereby
creating the potential for such utilities to reduce substantially their use of permits per unit of electricity
output. This will tend to create surplus permits. On the other hand, such utilities are likely to face a
much higher demand for electricity in the allocation year (2008) than they faced in the baseline year
(1990). This will tend to shrink the availability of surplus permits by forcing utilities to use permits
released by coal-gas conversion to support expanded power output.

Therefore, I am unable to predict

whether, on balance, electric utilities (particularly coal-fired electric utilities) will generate sizable
volumes of surplus permits in practice.
If this group of powerplants does generate significant surpluses, an upstream subsidies issue
could arise. Although electric utilities do not produce anything that moves directly in international trade,
they do sell power to manufacturing facilities. If the power is deemed subsidized, the downstream
product manufactured with the input of that power would be deemed to have received an ‘upstream
subsidy.’

Moreover, electric utilities will receive the lion’s share of permits under Option I and

subsidies to utilities almost certainly will be found to be ‘specific’ on the basis of the disproportionate use
specificity rule. An upstream subsidy that is deemed specific to the electric utility sector (see analysis
below) would be regarded as per se specific to all downstream buyers of electricity, regardless of their
diversity.
Under long-standing Commerce practice (unmodified by the Uruguay Round), an upstream
subsidy is defined as any subsidy that (1) is paid on an input product; (2) bestows a competitive
advantage on the downstream product; and (3) has a significant effect on the cost of manufacturing the
downstream product.13
13

As the SAA clarifies, subsidies on upstream products are only considered

See Hardwood Trailer Flooring from Canada, 62 FR 5201, download p. 4 (February 4, 1997).
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upstream subsidies to the extent they are passed through to the downstream product and have a significant
effect on the cost of manufacturing that downstream product.14 I am not aware of any reason to suppose
that other countries would analyze the case differently.
It is, of course, most unlikely that Option I would result in a lowering of electricity prices to
customers compared to pre-Option I status quo.

That is not the baseline for measuring the benefit to

downstream users, however. Benefit will be measured on the basis of an estimate of what the price of
electricity to customers would have been without the bestowal of surplus permits on certain utilities. This
price differential will be multiplied by total power supplied per year, to yield an overall yearly benefit.
This benefit will then divided pro rata among all utility customers according to their respective power
usage, unless there is some reason to believe that the utility is giving special price breaks to favored
customers.

This is the estimate of benefit that will be used to determine whether the upstream subsidy

has had a significant effect on input costs and provided a competitive advantage to the recipient firms.
Again, it is impossible to predict with certainty what this analysis will yield.

Specificity
Recognizing that governments exist to provide goods and services which confer a benefit, and not
wishing to define everything the government does as a subsidy, the Subsidies Agreement disciplines only
subsidies that are ‘specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries.’ (Art. 1.2).
Article 2 of the Subsidies Agreement states:
In order to determine whether a subsidy, as defined in paragraph 1 of Article 1, is specific to an
enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (referred to in this Agreement as
‘certain enterprises’) within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, the following principles
shall apply:

14

(a)

Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority
operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises, such subsidy shall be
specific.

(b)

Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority
operates, establishes objective criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for, and
amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall not exist, provided that the eligibility is automatic

SAA at 270, reprinted in Applebaum at 246.
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and that such criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to. The criteria or conditions
must be clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other official documents so as to be
capable of verification.15
Article. 2.1, note 2. Such are the guidelines for de jure specificity.

Recognizing that facially neutral

criteria may conceal targeting of specific industries or enterprises, by intention or effect, the Agreement
adds the following on de facto specificity:
(c)

If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the application of
the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are reasons to believe that the
subsidy may in fact be specific, other factors may be considered. Such factors are: (1)
use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises, (2) predominant
use by certain enterprises, (3) the granting of disproportionately large amounts of a
subsidy to certain enterprises, and (4) the manner in which discretion has been exercised
by the granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy. [enumeration added]

Any determination of specificity must be ‘clearly substantiated on the basis of positive evidence.’ (Art.
2.4).

The Administration has claimed, plausibly, that the language quoted above largely codifies prior

U.S. doctrine and practice.16 Thus, the issues is whether the Option I award of surplus permits to large
fossil fuel combustors would constitute a subsidy that is either de jure or de facto specific.
De jure specificity. Clearly, a subsidy program that benefits every industry in the economy is not
specific, while a subsidy program which is restricted by law to a single enterprise or industry is de jure
specific. The difficulty arises from intermediate cases such as ours, where the beneficiaries are likely to
be numerous and span several industry groupings, while falling far short of covering the entire economy
or even the entire manufacturing sector. Unfortunately, it turns out that the law on specificity is a study
in vagueness. Under U.S. practice, a subsidy is de jure specific only if the government ‘expressly limits

15

A footnote to this clause explains: “Objective criteria or conditions, as used herein, mean criteria or
conditions which are neutral, which do not favor certain enterprises over others, and which are economic in nature
and horizontal in application, such as number of employees or size of enterprise.”
16

SAA at 260-261, reprinted in Applebaum at 236-237. There is one area where U.S. law appears to diverge
from the Agreement. U.S. law ‘clarifies’ that Commerce shall find de facto specificity under sub-paragraph (c)
above (actually, its U.S. law counterpart) if any one or more of the four factors above ‘exist.’ 19 U.S.C.A. §
1677(5A)(D)(iii).
The Subsidies Agreement, as seen above, does not support the sufficiency of any one factor.
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access to a subsidy to a sufficiently small number of enterprises, industries, or groups of industries.’17
Both the Subsidies Agreement and U.S. countervailing duty law, however, are intentionally vague on the
concept of ‘sufficiently small.’ The Uruguay Round SAA observes:
As under existing law, clause (i) [of U.S. implementing legislation which tracks clause (a) of
Article 2 of the Subsidies Agreement] does not attempt to provide a precise mathematical formula
for determining when the number of enterprises or industries eligible for a subsidy is sufficiently
small so as to be properly considered specific. A proposal to establish such quantitative criteria
was made during the Uruguay Round and was quickly rejected by the United States and many
other participants. Commerce can only make such determinations on a case-by-case basis.18
Moreover, the vagaries of the term ‘sufficiently small’ are compounded by the definitional
problems. In any universe of subsidy users one can find many ‘industries’ -- or only a few (or one) -depending on how ‘industry’ or ‘group’ of industries/enterprises is defined.19

Under U.S. law, the basic

definition of ‘industry’ is clear enough from the statute: it means ‘the producers as a whole of a domestic
like product or those producers whose collective output of a domestic like product constitutes a major
proportion of the total domestic production of the product.’ 19 U.S.C. 1677(4). ‘Like product’
determinations, while frequently contested at the margins, are basically familiar to practitioners and
Option I clearly would make permits available to producers of a very wide variety of ‘like products.’
The definitional problem arises from section (5A) of the U.S. countervailing duty law, which adds a
kicker: “For purposes of this paragraph and paragraph (5B), any reference to an enterprise or industry is a
reference to a foreign enterprise or foreign industry and includes a group of such enterprises or
industries.” (italics added).
The word ‘group’ is statutorily undefined 20 and Commerce has expressly rejected the SIC or
ISIC classification approach to defining ‘group’ (or at least rejected the notion that there is any

17

SAA at 260, reprinted in Applebaum at 236.

18

SAA at 260, reprinted in Applebaum at 260.

19
For example, in Certain Softwood Lumber Commerce saw only two industries using stumpage. The
Canadian defendants, using a different approach to defining ‘industry,’ saw ‘twenty-seven different industries’ using
stumpage. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, U.S.-Canada Free Trade Area Binational Panel
Review (December 17, 1993), at 46.
20

The Subsidies Agreement offers no guidance as to the meaning of either ‘industry’ or ‘group.’ Article 2 of
the Subsidies Agreement does not even use these words, preferring the equally enigmatic term ‘certain enterprises.’
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requirement for such an approach), without offering any alternative ex ante approach.

Commerce has

even rejected the notion that a ‘group’ of industries must share common characteristics in order to be
called a group.21 Absent any governing criteria for defining a ‘group’, it would appear that Commerce
has retained broad discretion to define the term on a case by case basis.22

If other countries choose

equally ad hoc approaches in their countervailing duty practice, then foreign administering authorities
will have very broad scope to either countervail or exonerate U.S. tradable permit programs as they wish
(at least insofar as the specificity test is concerned).23 Likewise, the Subsidies Agreement states that a
subsidy is de jure specific if only ‘certain’ enterprises are eligible, but offers no clear guidance as to how
the word ‘certain’ is to be interpreted and applied in practice.
Suppose, next, that the eligibility for subsidy is determined, not by list, but by criteria: e.g., all
producers emitting more than ‘X’ tons of greenhouse gases per year. Sub-paragraph (b) suggests that
eligibility criteria expressed in ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ terms should escape de jure specificity, provided
the criteria were clearly spelled out in law or regulation, and do not favor ‘certain enterprises’ over others.
But what does it mean not to ‘favor certain enterprises over others’?

All eligibility criteria inherently

favor those firms that meet the criteria, and disfavor those that do not. The operative words appear to be
‘certain enterprises’, which is WTO-speak for what the U.S. refers to as a ‘sufficiently small’ or narrow
grouping as to justify a specificity finding.

Subsidies criteria drawn to benefit ‘too few’ enterprises

and/or industries will be deemed to favor ‘certain enterprises.’ In the end, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of
the Subsidies Agreement boil down to essentially the same de jure specificity test: whether the number of
enterprises and/or industries legally eligible for a government subsidy is ‘sufficiently small’ (or nondiverse) to justify a specificity finding. We are back to the same definitional conundrum. All we can do
is examine a few precedents to try to give readers a ‘feel’ for how this subjective determination of
specificity would be made.
21

Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 57
FR 22570 (May 28, 1992), download at 23A.
22

For example, in PPG v. United States (PPG I), 928 F.2d. 1568 (CAFC 1991) Commerce was invited by
domestic petitioners to define a group of ‘energy intensive’ industries in Mexico to support a finding that natural gas
subsidies furnished disproportionately to such a ‘group’ of users constituted a specific subsidy. To its credit,
Commerce declined; but, significantly, Commerce could not articulate any principled reason for doing so.
23

A second source of uncertainty arises from the fact that Commerce seldom explains its specificity findings in
much detail, and seldom articulates exactly how many and which firms or ‘industries’ (as defined by Commerce) are
eligible for subsidies in particular cases.
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Commerce has held that subsidies made formally available to all ‘agricultural’ producers are not
de jure specific,24 but subsidies limited to horticulture and greenhouse industries are specific (though
these two ‘industries’ span more than 60 categories of products).25

Similarly, in its re-determination

after an initial binational panel remand in Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, Commerce found that
stumpage subsidies made available to the ‘pulp and paper’ and ‘wood products’ industries were specific
even though 3,600 enterprises in these industries (accounting for 2.5 - 4 % of all enterprises in Canada)
actually used the stumpage and their products accounted for 9 percent of all commodities manufactured in
Canada.26 A bi-national U.S.-Canada FTA dispute panel (split perfectly along national lines) disagreed
and ordered Commerce to find the stumpage subsidies non-specific. As the panel noted, Commerce had
previously found that Mexican users of natural gas comprising only 3.5 percent of all Mexican companies
were non-specific (though they arguably spanned a larger number of different ‘industries’); and ‘counsel
for Commerce could refer to no case in which Commerce has found a group of users covering the
equivalent of three 2-digit SIC codes to be ‘too few.’‘27

What emerges from these examples is an

interplay between enterprise number and industry variety in de jure specificity determinations. Hundreds
of beneficiaries may be considered ‘too few’ if they are concentrated in one or two industries. The same
number of eligible beneficiaries (or a smaller number) may be considered non-specific if they range
across a wide variety of different industries.28

24

Live Swine from Canada, 59 FR 12243 (March 16, 1994), download p. 8.

25
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 57
FR 22570 (May 28, 1992), download p. 25.
26

What appears to have persuaded Commerce of the specificity of these subsidies was not the number of
enterprise beneficiaries, but the fact that only two ‘industries’ benefitted. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada, U.S.-Canada Free Trade Area Binational Panel Review (December 17, 1993), download pp. 10-14.
27

Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, U.S.-Canada Free Trade Area Binational Panel Review
(December 17, 1993), download pp. 14, 16, 19.
28
See, e.g. PPG Industries v. United States, 978 F.2d. 1232, 1241 (CAFC 1992) (holding that although the
actual number of eligible firms must be considered, it is not controlling. Instead, the actual make-up of eligible
firms must also be considered. A relatively small number of eligible firms will be considered non-specific if they
span a wide variety of industries); for the converse proposition, recall Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 57 FR 22570 (May 28, 1992) (holding that fact that
3500 firms actually use subsidy program is not dispositive where firms are limited to two industry sectors).

17
October 21, 2019 (6:30PM)

Discussion Draft, Do No Distribute

With these caveats, it should be noted that I have found no clear precedents in U.S. or WTO
practice where nominal subsidy eligibility extended as widely as is contemplated in Option I has been
found to be de jure specific.29 Option I applies very broadly on its face, and it seems unlikely that foreign
governments would choose a good faith climate change compliance measure to push the legal envelope in
finding the program de jure specific.
The greater danger lies in the area of de facto specificity.
De facto specificity. If the program is de jure specific, that is the end of the specificity analysis.
If, however, the program is found to be not de jure specific, then the administering authority must
further determine whether the program is de facto specific, applying sub-paragraph (c) of the Subsidies
Agreement. Four factors inform this analysis:
Pursuant to section 771(5A)(5)(D)(iii) of the Act [i.e. Uruguay Round implementing legislation] a
subsidy is de facto specific if one or more of the following four factors exists: (1) the number of
enterprises, industries or groups thereof which use a subsidy is limited; (2) there is predominant
use of a subsidy by an enterprise, industry, or group; (3) there is disproportionate use of a subsidy
by an enterprise, industry, or group; (4) the manner in which the authority providing a subsidy has
exercised discretion indicates than an enterprise or industry is favored over others.30
In U.S. practice, Commerce examines the factors sequentially, though this is not required by the
Subsidies Agreement text. The first factor cannot be taken literally: all numbers of enterprises and
industries are mathematically limited. As explained in the SAA, where the number of enterprises or
industries using a subsidy is ‘not large’ the first factor alone would justify a finding of specificity.
Where the number is ‘very large’ then Commerce analyzes factors (2) and (3) together, looking for
dominant or disproportionate use by enterprises or industries under investigation. Factor (4) is accorded
the least emphasis and typically is used only to clarify the analysis of the first three factors.31 But U.S.

29

[Are there cases where more narrowly drawn subsidies have been found de jure non-specific? ]

30

Certain Laminated Hardwood Trailer Flooring from Canada: Preliminary Negative Countervailing Duty
Determination, 61 FR 59079,59082 (November 20, 1996).
31
As the SAA explains, ‘The Administration intends to continue existing Commerce practice of according the
least significance to the factor regarding the exercise of discretion.’ Recognizing that administering authorities are
often required to exercise discretion in determining eligibility for all manner of government programs, the
Administration has held that exercise of discretion is not of itself sufficient to establish specificity. ‘The discretion
factor would have more value in connection with an analysis of other de facto specificity criteria.’ SAA at 261,
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law and practice is clear that specificity shall be found if any one of the first three factors exists. Id.
Commerce has expressly held that purposeful government targeting of a particular enterprise or industry
need not be shown.32 The question is one of effect: whether a relatively few firms or industries receive a
‘disproportionate’ share of subsides.
Under Commerce practice, predominant or disproportionate use is determined by examining the
investigated firms’ or industries’ share of total benefits actually disbursed under a subsidy.

Sometimes

Commerce will try to put this ratio in perspective by comparing it to the share of production accounted for
by firms or industries under investigation, as a proportion of production value of all ‘eligible’ firms.

If

the investigated firms’ share of benefits is large, or if it is significantly larger than the investigated firms’
share of total production (with shares being measured by reference to the total universe of eligible
participants), then Commerce is likely to find predominant use.
A few examples may help to further clarify the interpretation of the de facto specificity test. In
Live Swine from Canada, Commerce found that where the universe of eligible users was over 80
commodities, that was not de jure specific, but the fact that only 11-13 actually received benefits made
the program de facto specific.33
In Magnesium from Canada, the state-owned enterprise Hydro-Quebec sold electricity to eligible
industrial customers under long-term contracts which tied electricity prices to fluctuations in customers’
profitability and prices. Eligibility for this arrangement was limited to (1) capital intensive firms, (2)
requiring at least five Megawatts of electricity, (3) for which energy represents a major factor in
production costs (15 percent or more) and (4) for which energy costs constitute a major factor in choice of
location. Commerce did not find this program de jure specific, but did find de facto specificity because
only 14 companies enrolled in the program while over 300 users were nominally eligible.34

reprinted in Applebaum at 237.
32

Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 57
FR 22570 (May 28, 1992).
33

59 FR 12243, March 16, 1994.

34

Magnesium from Canada, 57 FR 30946, July 13, 1992.
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In Dutch Flowers a subsidy program nominally available to all agricultural producers was found
not de jure specific. But the subsidies received by horticulture firms were deemed de facto specific
because horticulture received 50 percent of the subsidy, while accounting for only 24 percent of Dutch
agricultural production.35
In Certain Steel Products from Belgium (Part IV) Commerce found that the respondent firms’s
share of total disbursed benefits (17-20 %) was ‘disproportionate’ because it made the steel industry the
‘largest single recipient.’36 Inasmuch as some industry will always the largest single recipient of any
subsidy program, however widely disbursed, this reasoning must be considered dubious.
In PPG I, however, Commerce declined to find de facto specificity despite a showing by
petitioners that 9 companies accounted for more than 50 percent of all benefits disbursed under the
program, and 23 companies got 60 percent.37 As the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit observed
of the same program challenged in a different case, ‘If only 60 percent of benefits are received by 23
companies in varying industries, one can only imagine the number and variety of companies which
received the remaining 40 percent of benefits.’38
In our case, we have seen that ‘surplus’ permits are likely to be concentrated in two categories of
firms: (1) firms with historically high emissions coupled with significant, relatively low-cost reduction
potential; and (2) firms exiting the industry or diverting manufacturing overseas (if they are allowed to
keep receiving permits in respect of closed facilities).

Without knowing the number and diversity of

firms that will comprise these categories, it is impossible to predict whether either or both would be
considered ‘specific.’ All we can say with confidence at this point is that the more widely distributed

35

Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from the Netherlands, 52
FR 3301 (Feb. 3, 1987). For a similar analysis, and result, see Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Determination: Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Products from the Republic of Korea, 49 FR 47284 (Dec. 3,
1984).
36

Certain Steel Products from Belgium (Part IV), 58 FR 37273, July 9, 1993,

37

This finding was reported and upheld in PPG Industries v United States, 746 F.Supp.119 (CIT Aug. 9, 1990).

38

PPG II, 978 F.2d 1232 (CAFC 1992).
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the pattern of subsidy use under any program, the less likely it is that a future WTO panel or national
administering authority will find it to be de facto specific.

Injury or serious prejudice
Under the Subsidies Agreement, government-provided financial contributions that provide a
benefit to ‘certain’ (read specific) enterprises are actionable if and only if they cause injury or serious
prejudice to the interests of a competing industry (or group of industries) in another country.39 Recall
that remedies to actionable subsidies may take the form of WTO dispute settlement, with respect to
impacts in the exporting country or in third-country markets that cause or threaten ‘serious prejudice’; or
national countervailing duty (CVD) actions with respect to impacts in the importing country that cause or
threaten ‘injury.’
With regard to national CVD determinations, Article 15 paragraph 1 (Paragraph 15.1) stipulates
that determinations of injury are to be based on ‘positive evidence and involve an objective examination
of both (a) the volume of subsidized imports and the effect of subsidized imports on prices in the
domestic market for like products and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on the domestic
producers of such products.’

Paragraph 15.2 clarifies that administering authorities should consider

whether there has been ‘a significant increase in subsidized imports,’ or ‘significant price undercutting by
subsidized imports as compared with the price of a like product in the importing Member,’ or ‘whether
the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree, or prevent price increases,
which otherwise would have occurred.’ Paragraph 15.4 lists a host of factors relevant to the examination
of the effect of subsidized imports in the importing country market.
The analysis described in paragraphs 15.2 and 15.4 is directed to the effect of subsidized imports,
not the effect of subsidies themselves.

The difference is important because subsidized imports could

undercut prices, depress prices or capture market share in a foreign market for a wide variety of reasons
that are totally unrelated to the effects of subsidies, or the magnitude of the subsidies conferred. For
many years prior to the Uruguay Round the United States took the position that ‘injury’ could be shown
solely on the basis of the effects of subsidized imports, without regard to the magnitude or impact of the
39

See Subsidies Agreement, Articles 5, 6 and 15.
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subsidies margins themselves.

Paragraph 15.5 of the Subsidies Agreement does not change that,

although it seems to, at first glance.40

Therefore, U.S. manufacturers receiving surplus allowances that

are found to be specific may face countervailing duty orders abroad if their exports to other markets cause
‘injury’ to foreign producers of like products, regardless of whether the injury to competitors actually
results from the value of the surplus permits received by U.S. firms. The injury analysis becomes
unpredictable from the standpoint of U.S. manufacturers and/or designers of tradable permits schemes.
The serious prejudice analysis is likely to be more circumscribed. Article 6 paragraph 2 of the
Subsidies Agreement holds that ‘serious prejudice shall not be found if the subsidizing member
demonstrates that the subsidy in question has not resulted in any of the effects enumerated in paragraph
3.’ The effects enumerated in paragraph 3 largely track the effects described in Article 15 (price
undercutting, price depression, market share capture, etc) with one crucial difference: each of the
objectionable effects mentioned in paragraph 15.3 must be attributable to ‘the effect of the subsidy,’ not
the effect of subsidized imports. Thus, the magnitude and effect of the subsidy does matter in serious
prejudice cases. Because the margin of subsidy is relevant to serious prejudice determinations, the
likelihood of a serious prejudice finding can be minimized by measures (mentioned above) to minimize
prospects of large accumulations of surpluses: (1) amending the allocation formula to reflect a ‘best
guess’ of the average emissions reduction potential for various classes and categories of sources; and (2)
implementing Option I under a rule which limits (perhaps time limits) the ability of firms to accrue
permits in respect of closed or downsized manufacturing facilities.

Option II
Option II seeks near total coverage of carbon emissions within an administratively manageable
cap and trade permit scheme. It does this by requiring, and restricting, permits for the sale of all fuels –
40

The first sentence states that, ‘It must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, through the effects of
subsidies, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement.’ But the sentence is modified by a footnote which
states ‘As set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4.’ As seen, these paragraphs deal exclusively with the effects of subsidized
imports. And the remainder of Paragraph 15.5 itself is devoted to a discussion of how the effects of subsidized
imports should be examined. It appears that the countries demanding greater attention to the magnitude and effect
of subsidies in the injury analysis almost got their concerns addressed, but not quite. Although the United States’
Statement of Administration Action is discretely silent on this nuance, no mention is made there or in the U.S.
implementing legislation of any change in the U.S. approach, and I expect that U.S. doctrine and practice remains
focused on the effect of subsidized imports, not the effect of subsidies themselves.
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coal, oil and natural gas – that emit carbon when combusted, and by focusing the permit requirement on
the narrowest points in the energy distribution chain. Under Option II, permits would be auctioned
(rather than given away) at the point of extraction for coal, refining for petroleum, and distribution for
natural gas. Permits would also be required for imports of refined petroleum products. Suppliers
wishing to conserve scarce permits would face an incentive under Option II to switch to less carbon
intensive fuels/products.

All users of energy would encounter energy price increases (highest for more

carbon-rich coal) that would encourage them to conserve fuel and/or switch to lower carbon fuels.
The Interim Report does not specify how the permits will be calibrated in each case, or whether
permits will be tradable across these four categories.

The Report notes in Appendix 3-1 that supply-side

allocations (as in Options 2 and 3) could be based on carbon content of the fuel, the energy content, or ‘on
a ‘performance’ metric, for example linking the allocation to a low carbon-content fuel standard’ such as
natural gas. Report at 3-45. The chief advantage of energy content and performance based metrics – as
I read Appendix 3-1 – is that they avoid advantaging high carbon coal producers in a scenario like Option
III where permits are awarded free of charge on the basis of past carbon, or energy, or natural-gas
equivalent carbon emissions. Such variations would not seem to have any particular advantage in the
context of auctioned permits, so I assume the preference under Option II would be for permits expressed
in units of carbon content of fuel sold.41
WTO Analysis
Subsidies issues seem unlikely to arise in this option since all permits are auctioned. However,
issues of national treatment could arise if the option is implemented in a way that discriminates against
foreign products.

It is difficult to anticipate all the possible ways that ingenious national regulators

and/or domestic producers might conceive to discriminate against foreign competitors.

Two obvious

modes of discrimination present themselves, however: (1) requiring fuel/petroleum product importers to
hold permits at a different (probably earlier) stage of processing than applies to domestic producers
41
As the authors of the Interim Report are no doubt aware, the ‘carbon content’ of a ton of fuel sold does not
bear a fixed correspondence to actual carbon emissions from combustion. The latter depends significantly on the
efficiency of the combustion process, which may vary dramatically depending on the nature, age, and sophistication
of the combustion process used. Since the details of later combustion cannot be known in advance at the point of
supply, I assume that the administrators of Option II would base carbon-content calculations for permit purposes
based on some ‘average’ or ‘modeled’ combustion scenario.
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(without making appropriate adjustments), so that foreign producers have to purchase more permits per
unit than their similarly situated domestic counterparts; or (2) calculating the carbon content of foreign
fuels/products in a way that requires them to hold more permits per unit than similarly situated domestic
producers. Barring the exercise of such invidious ingenuity at the implementation stage, I see no WTO
problems arising from Option II.

Option III
Option III envisions a combination of (a) energy efficiency product standards for small sources
(transport vehicles, residential and small commercial furnaces, air conditioning units, lighting fixtures and
appliances) and (b) a cap-and-trade scheme covering fossil fuel producers, who would be required to hold
one permit for each ton of carbon-equivalent energy sold.

The overall cap would be set at 1300 MtC

per year, lowered by the amount deemed necessary for any set aside programs. These 1300 million
permits would be distributed each year among oil and gas producers (not refineries or pipelines), coal
extractors and coal combustors.

The cap would be allocated to oil, gas and coal producers according to

each producer’s pro rata share of carbon production in some base year such as 1990.42 Half of the coal
producers’ allocation, however, would be diverted to large coal combustors based on their consumption in
the base year. Coal combustors would have no regulatory need for these permits and could sell (or trade)
them back to their coal suppliers or, if they switch fuels, back to their oil and gas suppliers; or combustors
could simply sell the permits on the open market. The award of ‘freeby’ permits to coal combustors is
intended to help compensate them for the cost of fuel switching and/or process re-design to minimize coal
use.
WTO Analysis
Since Option III treats oil and gas producers, coal producers, and coal combustors separately,
each requires a separate WTO analysis.

Alternatively, permits might be awarded according to each producer’s pro rata share of energy
content, or natural-gas equivalent carbon content, thereby favoring oil and gas producers even more
strongly. See Interim Report, Appendix 3-1.
42

24
October 21, 2019 (6:30PM)

Discussion Draft, Do No Distribute

Treatment of oil and gas producers.

The treatment of oil and gas producers under Option III

raises issues of national treatment and subsidies. The United States imports a substantial portion of the
oil and a small but growing fraction of its natural gas supply. Article III of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1947 (incorporated in the WTO Agreement and referred to hereafter as ‘GATT”)
requires that oil and gas imports receive national treatment in the allocation of permits, i.e., that they
receive permits under the same formula that applies to domestic oil and gas unless some compelling
policy justification can be advanced for distinguishing between foreign and domestic oil and gas.43 Since
there are no real environmental reasons to distinguish between domestically-produced and imported oil
and gas, the exceptions of GATT Article XX would not provide a basis for discrimination. The national
security exceptions of GATT Article XXI clearly would allow the United States to deny permits to Iran,
Iraq and other pariah nations. The United States has construed that article to authorize banning imports
from these countries entirely.44

But the national security exception obviously would not justify

discriminating against imports from ‘friendly’ countries.
Does this present a political problem for Option III in the United States?

Not so long as foreign

competitors continue to export fossil fuels to the United States up to the level of their allocated permits.
It has long been understood that the national treatment obligation of the GATT extends to imported oil
and gas. The recent WTO decision in Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline reaffirmed that principle and the United States’ willingness to amend its laws and regulations to conform to

43

A restriction on imported oil and gas would seem, at first blush, to more closely resemble a quantitative
import restriction subject to GATT Article XI than an internal regulation covered by GATT Article III. However, a
well-known Note to Article III stipulates that “any law, regulation or requirement . . . which applies to an imported
product and to the like domestic product and is . . . enforced in the case of the imported product at the time of
importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as . . . a law, regulation or requirement . . . subject to the provisions of
Article III.” See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947), Note ad Article III, reprinted in, inter alia,
Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994), para. 5.8.
That clearly is the situation created by Option III, which aims to restrict overall sales of coal, oil and gas by
domestic and foreign producers of fossil-fuel products.
44

GATT Article XXI contains ‘security exceptions’ which provide legal cover for a wide range of foreignpolicy or security-based trade restrictions and discriminations that the United States has long maintained and
continues to maintain against ‘enemy’ or ‘unfriendly’ states. Pursuant to these exceptions, the United States can
and would refuse to issue emissions permits to extractors based in Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Cuba, Libya, and the like.
This would present no problem under GATT law. (Moreover, none of the extractors in these countries could have
any baseline of exports into the United States that would justify an allocation, since these countries are subject to
long-standing and comprehensive U.S. trade embargoes.)
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that decision signals, I believe, a political acceptance in the United States that imported oil and gas, like
other products, are entitled to national treatment under U.S. regulations.45
A political hue and cry is likely to develop in the United States under Option III only if, or when,
a foreign producer chooses a diversion or exit strategy -- reducing fossil fuel exports to the United States
and taking revenues from the sale of now-surplus permits to cross-subsidize overseas production in other
areas, say, cars, shoes or petrochemicals.46 At this point, U.S. producers of cars, shoes or petrochemicals
will cry foul, saying that the U.S. government is indirectly subsidizing foreign competition at the expense
of the American energy consumer (whose supplier is forced to absorb the cost of buying the surplus
permits).

Should such a scenario develop, the Administration would come under strong domestic

political pressure to curtail issuance of permits to foreign firms who fail to use them to cover exports to
the United States.
There are two ways to resolve this dilemma (should it materialize) on terms consistent with
GATT/WTO. The first is simply to ban the cross-subsidization of all products, foreign or domestic, using
revenues derived from the sale of surplus permits.47

However, such a rule would limit the economic

45

See World Trade Organization Appellate Body: Report of the Appellate Body in United States - Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996).
46
What is a ‘foreign’ enterprise, for purposes of understanding the domestic politics of cross-subsidies?
Clearly, U.S.-owned firms that manufacture in the United States are domestic, and foreign-owned (particularly stateowned) firms that manufacture abroad -- such as Petroleos de Mexico (PEMEX) or Petroleos de Venezuela
(PDVSA) -- figure as purely ‘foreign’ firms in the U.S. political process. The gray area consists of principally
U.S.-owned and managed firms (like Exxon) who elect to set up a manufacturing operation overseas, and
traditionally foreign-owned and managed firms (like British Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell) who have a large
presence in the United States. Does national identity in the U.S. political process follow ownership or place of
manufacture? The question is a hard one. The discussion that follows assumes that national identity will follow
ownership: i.e., that Congress will not begrudge surplus permits to Exxon even if that company applies some of the
revenues towards setting up a manufacturing plant in Indonesia. I leave open the possibility that firms such as
BP and Shell that have a large U.S. presence might also be defined as ‘domestic’ firms for subsidies eligibility
purposes. Since the WTO Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMS Agreement) incorporates
GATT Article III by reference, and since GATT Article III contains a subsidies exception, it appears that the
TRIMS Agreement would not preclude the United States from conditioning ‘domestic’ status for subsidies purposes
on an agreement by a recipient firm to apply the proceeds from sale of surplus permits exclusively to U.S.
manufacturing operations.
47
The ban would apply to all producers, foreign and domestic. It would be enforced not by WTO cases or
countervailing duty actions, but simply by denying future permit allocations to any company found in violation of
the ban. Evidentiary problems would not arise since companies wishing to continue to receive future allocations
of permits would have to agree to open their books to verify compliance with the cross-subsidy ban. GATT
national treatment obligations would be respected since foreign and domestic energy producers would be treated
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incentives for companies to exit (or partially exit) from high-carbon activities -- even though exit (or
partial exit) is the environmentally preferred result.
The second way to deal with the political problem of appearing to ‘subsidize’ foreign suppliers (if
the problem arises) is simply to allow U.S. fossil fuel suppliers, but not foreign suppliers, to sell ‘surplus’
permits.

Foreign suppliers would be subject to a use-or-lose rule in respect of permits issued them.

There is some risk that a WTO panel would regard this as a facial discrimination that violates GATT
Article III. The better view, however, is that the issuance of free permits not needed to meet regulatory
requirements is, in essence, an indirect subsidy on U.S. oil and gas firms leaving high-carbon activities.
‘Discrimination’ against foreign suppliers is simply a way of limiting the benefit of the subsidy to U.S.
companies. GATT Article III.8(b) explicitly exempts subsidies from national treatment requirements.
In practice, oil and gas producers could generate large surpluses only by reducing sales in the
United States market below their baseline-year levels.

Given that coal conversion is likely to increase

the demand for oil and gas, why would any profit-maximizing oil and gas company choose to reduce its
U.S. sales? Mainly because, under Option III as written, every unit of oil/gas that was sold by a
company in the allocation baseline year generates one permit a year, in perpetuity, for the selling
company. If the corresponding unit of oil and gas is diverted overseas in the allocation year, that
generates a subsidy -- in the form of a one free, salable permit each year -- for the diverting oil and gas
company.

Given this incentive, oil and gas companies with historic U.S. sales almost certainly will

choose to divert some traditional U.S. supplies of oil and gas to overseas markets. That diversion will
create a price-spike of oil and gas in the United States which will either lure in new suppliers who will
buy permits to meet the demand, or reduce the incentive for historic suppliers to divert. Eventually,
supply and demand will equilibrate at a U.S. price which equals the overseas price of oil and gas plus the
market value of the associated permits.

From the standpoint of U.S. oil and gas consumers, Option III

will be identical to Option II in terms of energy price impact: unit energy prices will increase by the full
amount of the cost of purchasing the corresponding permits.

But the revenues that would go to the

identically. Cross-subsidization of low-carbon energy products using revenues from sale of surplus permits would be
allowed because (1) it furthers the environmental purpose of encouraging a transition from high-carbon to lowcarbon fuels, and (2) barring any cross-subsidization would undermine the compensatory purpose of an exit rule that
allows firms leaving an energy industry to go on receiving surplus permits (see discussion above).
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government under Option II’s auction system will be lavished on historic oil and gas suppliers as
subsidies under Option III.
Few foreign countries are likely to complain of receiving subsidized oil and gas from the United
States or erstwhile U.S. suppliers.

But the U.S. political opposition to such a scheme could be

considerable, and WTO subsidies issues could arise if oil and gas companies use revenues from the sale
of surplus permits to ‘cross-subsidize’ other manufactured products into which those companies diversify:
indirect subsidies are subsidies. One way to avoid this result is to craft an anti-diversion rule for Option
III: e.g. reduce each oil and gas firm’s entitlement to ‘surplus’ permits (permits in excess of allocationyear U.S. oil and gas sales) by the amount of any increase in that firm’s overseas sales of oil and gas in
the allocation year (or increase above a certain level) compared to the baseline year.
Treatment of coal extractors. U.S. imports of coal are very small currently (.18 Quads in 1995)
but growing. As discussed above in connection with oil and gas producers, GATT Article III requires
that any pro rata allocation of permits to domestic producers must extend to foreign coal extractors as
well. The only permissible distinction between domestic and foreign coal producers is that foreign coal
producers could be subject to a use-or-lose requirement, i.e., denied access to salable ‘surplus’ permits.
This, however, would raise subsidies issues which this section will explore.
Coal extractors will face three adverse impacts under Option III: (1) the overall number of
permits allocable to the coal sector in aggregate will fall well short of what is needed to support historic
levels of sales (with the magnitude of the shortfall dependent on whether permits are awarded on a
carbon, energy, or ‘performance’ basis); (2) over half of the limited number of permits allocable to the
coal sector will be given to combustors instead of extractors; and (3) coal combustors will have large
incentives to switch fuels, contributing to a reduced customer base for coal.

Faced with these

incentives, some coal suppliers doubtless will remain in business to supply customers (such as steel and
cement) whose processes leave them few attractive alternatives to coal. However, the dominant response
of U.S. coal extractors to Option III is likely to be either (a) the diversion of domestic coal to foreign
markets; or (b) the exit or partial exit of a portion of the U.S. coal industry from the business of mining
coal.
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The diversion scenario is distinctly problematic from an environmental and subsidies perspective.
The United States is a significant coal exporter: over the last 25 years, U.S. coal exports have ranged from
53 million short tons (1973) to 105 million tons (1990). The U.S. exported 88.5 million tons of coal in
1995.48

Certainly, one attractive option for U.S. coal extractors faced with scarce permits and declining

demand for domestic coal will be to drastically reduce domestic sales, and use the revenues from sale of
now-surplus permits to cross-subsidize exports of coal to foreign markets. From an environmental
perspective, diversion of U.S. coal to foreign markets will simply depress the price of, and encourage the
use of, coal abroad -- an environmentally perverse result. From a WTO perspective, importing countries
without an indigenous coal supply are unlikely to complain of subsidized coal imports. However,
countries that have domestic coal industries and that either import U.S. coal or compete with U.S. coal in
third markets may bring subsidies challenges to protect their traditional markets.
In these challenges, the allocation of surplus permits to U.S. coal extractors will be considered a
financial contribution; the benefit will be measured by the total yearly revenues from surplus permit sales
divided total coal sales of each company; and the specificity test will certainly be met. Coal will be
considered a “specific” industry.49

Thus, the only legal defenses to a subsidies challenge will the fact-

specific, economic defenses that the subsidy margin is de minimis, and/or that the subsidy/subsidized
imports cause no serious prejudice/injury, respectively, to complainants.

The likely success, or not, of

these economic defenses is hard to predict. One the one hand, Option III calls for half the coal
48

Statistical Abstract of the United States (1997), Table No. 937, p. 590 and Table No. 930, p. 587.

49

Foreign governments/WTO panels are not likely to buy the argument that subsidies to coal extractors should
be considered integrally linked to subsidies to coal combustors under Option III, with specificity determined
according to the numerousness and diversity of extractors and combustor combined. The ‘integral linkage’
doctrine does exist in U.S. practice, where it has been developed to allow for the linkage of specificity
determinations in respect of subsidy programs that are nominally separate but in fact “have the same specific
purpose and bestow the same types of benefits on different users.” See Live Swine from Canada: Final Results of
Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews, 61 FR. 52408, 52423 (Oct. 7, 1996). But the doctrine has been
narrowly construed. Id. at 52514. Commerce has required that different programs have the same specific purpose
; sharing the same general purpose is not sufficient. Id. at 52421. Moreover, the different programs must “treat
industries equally.” Id. at 52422. See also Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia: Final Results of
Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 59 FR 58814, 58817 (Nov. 15, 1994). Here, Option III certainly could
be characterized as a single program with the single general purpose of reducing carbon emissions from the United
States. However, its specific treatment of coal extractors, oil and gas producers, and coal combustors, respectively,
is quite different and serves somewhat different specific purposes. The specific purpose of the extractor permit
requirement is mainly regulatory; the purpose of the combustor permit award is mainly compensatory. Therefore,
the issuance of surplus permits to extractors and combustors under Option III is not likely to be linked for specificity
determination purposes.

29
October 21, 2019 (6:30PM)

Discussion Draft, Do No Distribute

extractors’ supply of permits to siphoned off to combustors. Moreover, a substantial cache of permits
will be needed to supply remaining inelastic U.S. coal demand in industries like steel and cement that
depend on coal.

On the other hand, any rule that awards permits in respect of historic, domestic coal

sales that are diverted overseas will create a very significant incentive to export and could yield quite
substantial surpluses. If economic analysis reveals the diversion scenario to be credible, it may be
desirable to fashion an anti-diversion rule for coal extractors as well as oil and gas producers.
The second possible strategy for coal extractors under Option III is one of exit or partial exit from
the industry. Certainly a mere downsizing of operations would raise not WTO issues if the output
reduction is limited to the amount dictated by scarcity of permits: there would be no surplus permits and
no subsidy.

The main subsidies litigation risk associated with an exit or partial exit strategy involves a

scenario in which coal extractors reduce operations enough to generate sizable volumes of surplus
permits, sale of which yields a non-de minimis subsidy for (i) remaining coal sales; and/or (ii) non-coal
products manufactured by the same firms.
Subsidization of remaining coal sales might conceivably trigger a challenge by foreign importers
(or would-be importers) of coal who would argue that the revenues provided by sale of surplus permits
cause ‘serious injury’ by enabling U.S. coal extractors to cut prices and maintain U.S. market share at a
level greater than they otherwise would enjoy.

However, such a predicate for a ‘serious injury’ claim

would be difficult to establish in practice inasmuch as domestic extractors, by definition, can create
‘surplus’ permits under Option III only to the extent that they reduce their own sales of coal in the United
States.50 It seems unlikely, furthermore, that foreign importers would bring a WTO challenge to
complain of lost sales in an historically minuscule and shrinking U.S. market for imported coal.
Subsidies to coal extractors in the form of salable permits would also be deemed subsidies to any
non-coal products manufactured by those same firms.

Indeed, one environmentally desirable

consequence of Option III might be to encourage coal firms to exit the industry in favor of other lines of

50
Foreign exporters may, of course, argue that reduced sales are not the same thing as reduced market share.
Subsidies can cause serious injury if they allow domestic manufacturers to preserve or expand their relative share of
a shrinking market. Nonetheless, the difficulty of the case when combined with the smallness of the prize (a tiny
and shrinking U.S. coal market for imports) is likely to dim any enthusiasm for WTO litigation on the part of
foreign coal extractors.
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work. This response, however, could provoke a WTO challenge by foreign competing manufactures of
those subsidized non-coal products (e.g., cars, shoes, petrochemicals, etc.).

The merits of such a

challenge would depend on the extent to which coal extractors (a) substantially exit the coal mining
industry (generating large revenues from sale of now-surplus permits); and (b) manufacture a limited
range of non-coal products (so as to focus cross-subsidies on specific categories of products).

It seems

improbable that both these factors would come together in practice but, if they did, a subsidies issue
might arise. If further analysis reveals there is a real prospect of sizable surpluses accruing to coal
extractors who are subsidizing specific new products, then it may be desirable to enact a rule limiting the
time period in which coal companies can continue to amass permits in respect of historic U.S. coal sales.
Treatment of coal combustors. In a happy contrast to the situation of extractors -- who would
have to hold one permit for each unit of fuel supplied, while receiving fewer permits than they need -coal combustors under Option III would receive their permits free of charge and free of any
corresponding regulatory obligations.51 All permits issued to combustors would be ‘surplus’ and could
be sold back for cash or fuel price offsets to fuel extractors (oil, gas or coal) who need permits. Thus, the
financial contribution and benefit implicit in the award of free permits to coal combustors would render
them a clear case of indirect subsidy.52
Here, 90 percent of the permits awarded coal combustors under Option III would flow to coalfired electric power plants and the remaining 10 percent would be distributed widely, with most of that 10
percent concentrated in four major industries: primary metals, paper and paper products, chemicals and
allied products, and food products. The award of 90 percent of the permits to coal-fired electric power
plants would clearly constitute a ‘specific’ subsidy to those plants. As we observed in the discussion of
Option I, although most electric utilities do not sell anything moving in international trade, they do sell
51

This important aspect of Option III is not stated directly in the Interim Report; it is implied in the Report and
confirmed by telephone conversation with K. John Holmes, May 26, 1998.
52

Again, the United States cannot defend the scheme against subsidies challenge by pointing out that free
permits to coal combustors are offset by the higher fuel prices to those combustors. That fact is irrelevant under the
WTO. The price signal generated by Option III is similar in economic effect to an economy-wide fuel tax, with a
partial rebate of the tax to certain industries. The Subsidies Agreement is clear that a rebate of general taxes to
selected industries is an actionable subsidy if the industries thus favored are few enough to be ‘specific.’ The same
conclusion is likely to apply to a permit requirement which produces a economy-wide increase in the price of fuel,
while compensating coal combustors with valuable, salable permits.
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electricity to manufacturing firms that export goods.

These firms would be deemed to have received an

‘upstream subsidy’ if and to the extent that the utilities’ revenues from sale of permits are (1) passed on to
customers in the form of lower electricity prices than would otherwise obtain; (2) bestow a competitive
advantage on the downstream products, and (3) have a significant effect on the cost of manufacturing the
downstream products.53

Under U.S. practice, at least, the fact that permit subsidies are ‘specific’ to

electric utilities would render them per se specific to all the utilities’ customers as well. However, unless
the utilities were found to have channeled cost savings to certain favored customers, the benefits of
permits (those passed on to customers) would be distributed over all utility customers. Further economic
analysis would be needed to determine whether the passed-through electricity price benefits to any single
customer would be found competitively significant when allocated over the customer’s production lines.
The remaining 10 percent of the coal combustor’s permits awarded directly to manufacturing
facilities would probably not be considered specific subsidies. Many different firms and industry groups
would be eligible for, and would receive permits under the scheme, and the allocation of only 10 percent
of the permits among the four broad industries described above is not likely to render such permits de
facto specific.

Option IV
Option IV inverts Option III, with a twist.

Instead of requiring extractors to hold permits to sell

and issuing ‘freeby’ permits to large combustors that can be sold back to extractors (as in Option III),
Option IV would require large combustors to hold permits to emit (as in Option I) and issue ‘freeby’
emissions permits to compensate coal extractors. Since coal extractors would not need any of these
emissions permits issued to support their own operations, they would be free to sell all the permits issued
to them back to regulated entities who do need permits to meet regulatory obligations. (Option IV is thus
made politically attractive to coal extractors in the same way that Option III is attractive to coal
combustors.) Revenues obtained by coal extractors from sales of permits could then be (1) retained, paid
to employees or dividended to shareholders; (2) used to cross-subsidize a transition into other lines of
work; (3) used to offset the purchase price paid by domestic coal consumers (thereby reducing their
disincentive to shift out of coal); and/or (4) used to cross-subsidize export sales of coal. These are the

53

See Hardwood Trailer Flooring from Canada, 62 FR 5201, download p. 4 (February 4, 1997).
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options open to coal extractors under Option III; the difference is that under Option IV, coal extractors
would have many more ‘surplus’ permits to work with. As in Option III, the U.S. government is likely
to preclude the fourth response (cross-subsidizing exports) by regulation since using permit revenues to
expand exports of coal would tend to displace, rather than reduce, global coal combustion, thereby
undermining the global environmental objectives of the scheme.
The ‘twist’ embedded in Option IV is that auto manufacturers who sell in the United States
market also would be required to hold emissions permits (allocated on the basis of each automaker’s
future emissions commitment for its fleet, on the basis of standard assumptions about vehicle miles
driven).

Automakers would be allowed to buy permits from, or sell permits to, combustors or coal

extractors on a market basis, subject to the regulatory requirement that each automaker must hold one
permit for each unit of future emissions predicted from its fleet.
WTO Analysis
The treatment of automakers under the cap-and-trade scheme (the ‘twist’) would not violate
WTO rules provided it is implemented in a non-discriminatory fashion. In particular, fleet emissions
must be modeled via methodologies that are consistent for all fleets and do not discriminate against
foreign manufacturers.

Any ‘subsidies’ to automakers conferred under Option IV by means of the

availability of ‘surplus’ permits would not be actionable if they are made available on a nondiscriminatory basis to foreign as well as domestic manufacturers.

Given the near-total blurring of

national identity that currently characterizes the auto industry it seems unlikely that the prospect of
bestowing subsidies on, say, Honda or Toyota would be politically explosive – particularly if those
‘subsidies’ must be earned by emissions performance, and all automakers are equally able to earn them on
the same terms.
The issuance of free permits to large stationary combustors is also unlikely to raise major
subsidies issues since such combustors, under Option IV, will not receive any meaningful volumes of
surplus permits except to the extent they exit their industries, and they are unlikely to exit their main line
of business merely in order to generate a relatively meager ration of surplus permits.
The preferential treatment afforded domestic coal extractors, on the other hand, would raise the
subsidies issues discussed in connection with the treatment of coal extractors under Option III, aggravated
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by the fact that coal extractors under Option IV would receive permits unencumbered by regulatory
obligations, and thus would have many more ‘surplus’ permits to work with. In practice, the United
States is an insignificant importer of coal, so foreign governments are not likely to bother complaining of
domestic coal subsidies on import substitution grounds. The main risk of a subsidies challenge would
arise if, and to the extent that, U.S. coal extractors choose (and are allowed) to reduce U.S. sales (through
downsizing production or diverting domestic coal sales overseas), continue to receive permits in respect
of historic U.S. sales, and use the revenues from permit sales to cross-subsidize coal (or other product)
sales in foreign markets. In this event the by-now-familiar subsidies issues would arise: the value of
surplus permits thus awarded would be financial contributions that confer a benefit on a specific industry:
coal extraction. They would be actionable if they caused injury or serious prejudice to interests of
competing producers of a like product.
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